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Abstract / Résumé : 
We briefly propose a possibly more precise systemic understanding of the process of crisis with the purpose of 
allowing suitable, appropriate modifying interventions. Examples and types of crises are introduced. At a 
suitable level of representation we consider crisis as a non-autonomous parasitic process of the hosting one(s); 
processes acquiring characteristics autonomous with respect to those of the hosting process(es); processes 
converging to degeneration and malfunctioning; which are emergent and given by coherent, subsequent and 
related new degenerative properties or loss of coherence among emergent processes of the hosting one(s). 
Possible symptoms for diagnostics and prediction of processes of crisis are outlined. Types of crisis are 
considered and some generic exemplifying types of actions on crises are proposed. The main purpose of this 
article is to show that different types of processes of crisis having different natures are possible and that 
suitable, appropriate approaches should be adopted. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This article intends to clarify theoretically the concept of crisis. Furthermore, possible types of crisis 
are introduced. A proper understanding of them may allow more effective and appropriate, possibly 
preventative or ongoing actions and approaches to deal with crises, whereas typical interventions are a 
posteriori, oriented to recover and reduce the final negative or intermediate implications often through 
an assumption of linearity.  
The more common understanding of crisis relates to situations where degeneration occurs possibly 
through sudden or successive negative events. The concept of crisis possesses an intrinsic negative 
generic meaning related to the fact that it usually applies to phenomena having social impact perhaps 
of an economic, educational, medical, military, philosophical, political, psychological, or sociological 
nature, rather than relating to the natural sciences such as physics where conceptually corresponding 
phenomena such as the occurrence of complex dynamics between classic and quantum regimes in 
phase transitions and symmetry breaking have been studied and exhaustively understood theoretically 
(Solé, 2011).  
This article addresses a readership interested in the negative generic meaning used when dealing with 
the social cases mentioned above. The purpose is to ensure, through a more precise theoretical 
understanding of the concept of crisis, suitable interventions as presented here from a conceptual and 
methodological point of view postponing future possibly related quantitative models suitable for 
simulations. Some concepts relating to crises typical of the science of complexity should be  
transformed into culture, knowledge to manage the knowledge society (Kumar, 2004) which today 
still uses the knowledge of industrial society (Haunss, 2015). The knowledge of industrial society was 
suitable for dealing with pre-complexity problems. The knowledge society is characterised by 
complex problems requiring newly appropriated knowledge such as the ability to suitably deal with 
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loss of coherence and consider the conceptual framework of theoretical incompleteness (Minati, 
2016a). 
It is not matter of divulging but, rather, of making such concepts usable, for instance, by educators, 
entrepreneurs, managers and politicians, by inserting or updating current language with new available 
meanings corresponding closely to their original scientific meanings. 
Within a series of articles dedicated to knowledge for managing the knowledge society (Minati, 
2012a; 2012b; 2015) this article attempts this transformation for the concept of crisis. 
CRISIS 
The term crisis has a wide variety of different possible disciplinary meanings.  
A first possible understanding of the concept of crisis occurs when within an on-going process under 
study one observes the occurrence of events such as anomalies, discontinuities or degenerations. The 
process deviates from its original path and the sequence of deviations is understood as the process of 
crisis. 
In this regard, within a process a crisis can be considered as a sequence(s) of changes, for example, in 
the values of a variable over time, considered to be negative as they involve, for instance, 
degeneration, instability or collapse, leading, for instance, to malfunctioning, loss of coherence(s), 
exhaustion, loss of sustainability, and loss of convergence.  
In this case crisis may be intended as a kind of process parasitic of the original ones. 
Conceptually it is possible to distinguish between the process of crisis and the hosting parasitized 
process when the crisis consists of deviations from and anomalies in the original one. 
For instance, sequences of expenses which are subtracted from revenues and their sequences constitute 
the crisis, increasing debt and leading towards bankruptcy.  
The variable, subject to such negative changes may, partially or completely, directly represent the 
process under study, such as increasing debt, or indirectly relate to the processes being, for instance, 
statistical or acquired (e.g., emergent) or mesoscopic (see the sub-section Levels of representation) 
when considering properties of clusters of interrelated variables, when relating, for example, to the 
health of a person through vital physiological indicators. 
A second possible concept of crisis occurs when single critical events take place, having as a 
consequence the activation of a process of crisis: an earthquake has the consequences of subsequent 
damage. This process of crisis superimposes, perturbs, or even replaces the on-going processes.  
When non-stochastic, such subsequent changes constituting a crisis may be sufficiently correlated, 
coherent, to establish a process, for example, external coherent perturbations such as the irregular 
process of the gradual disintegration of a mountain or the depletion of an aquifer. 
Both in this case of sequences of aftermaths activated by critical events, and in the case of sequences 
of changes, deviations from the original path considered above, we consider henceforth crises as 
processes of crisis being aftermaths or changes almost correlated. As we shall see, more sophisticated 
correlations, such as non-linear ones, establish autonomous processes of crisis including emergent 
processes. 
The processes of crisis are specific in their intrinsic non-sustainability (since they lead to degeneration 
or malfunctioning of the hosting process) and in their belonging to the domains of negative coherences 
which degenerate and disintegrate hosting processes.  
However, this does not mean that a process of crisis might not lead to a novel situation understandable 
later as a radical development, as a game changer. 
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EXAMPLES AND TYPES OF CRISES 
We now introduce some specific examples for a more complete understanding of the concept of crisis 
considered above. 
One possible elementary understanding of the concept of crisis is the notion of malfunctioning usually 
attributed to devices having occasional or degenerative problems in their operation, i.e., crises in their 
functioning converging to situations of out of order as the final effect. 
We also mention the concept of crisis as an increasing loss of equilibrium; a temporary crisis expected 
to allow resumption of the original properties; repetitive crises; exhaustion leading to a recovery of 
original properties or through the use of antagonistic actions to recover the original configuration. 
Examples of crisis, understood as processes to be recovered are available in economics, the first 
example being the tulip mania, in March 1637 (Dash, 2019), medicine (asthma attacks or 
cardiovascular crises; or a failed healing process), social relationships (marriage crises), or in 
cognitive science (due to stress, burnout).  
In economics, Crisis Theory has been introduced (see, for instance, Shaikh, 2016; Walby, 2015). 
Other different disciplinary understandings of the concept of crisis exist, for instance, in philosophy 
(Bunge, 2001; Franzini, 2015) when considering the process of the increasing inadequacy of a 
philosophical concept to deal with new cultural and social situations. New situations may derive from 
criticism or the appearance of new problems arising, for instance, from new technologies or scientific 
discoveries, e.g., the concepts of life, mind, and time-space. In political science (Paxton et al., 2015) 
one can consider, for instance, the crisis of the Roman Empire or of Communism, as well as the crisis 
in the classical concept of freedom which now has to take into account new possibilities of intervening 
in society today and in communications allowing increasing manipulation of information, leading even 
to requests for redefining the concept of democracy (Diamond and Plattner, 2015; Minati, 2006; 
2016b). 
At this point one has to consider the difference, if any, between the concept of crisis and that of 
catastrophe, often intended as a sudden and widespread disaster. A first difference is given by the fact 
that the concept of crisis has the nature of a process whereas the concepts of catastrophe and disaster 
have a prevalent nature of effects. 
Catastrophe may be considered as one of the possible results of a process of crisis. 
One example of a technical understanding of catastrophe is that of catastrophic learning in Neural 
Networks (Haykin, 2008; Pessa and Penna, 1995).  
Catastrophic learning occurs when a neural network which has learned a training set of items, 
subsequently learns a new item where the result is usually a ‘catastrophic forgetting’ of the earlier 
items.  
Catastrophe Theory was introduced by René Thom in the 1960s (Saunders, 2010). 
In fact, small changes in the values of certain parameters of a non-linear system can cause 
equilibriums to appear or disappear along with their dynamics producing sudden, significant changes 
in the behaviour of the system as occurs in chaotic systems (Rasband, 2015).  Catastrophe Theory 
studies the various ways in which system response can change at a bifurcation point (change of 
attractors) whereas chaos theory studies the sensitivity of a system to its initial conditions. 
Catastrophe Theory allows such sudden changes intended as bifurcation points to be represented on 
well-defined geometrical structures (change of attractors). 
In short, this theory considers a catastrophe as a critical degenerate (or irregular) point, stationary or 
singular, on a smooth, universally differentiable surface, where points are radical bifurcations in the 
behaviour of the system.  
Catastrophe Theory, although suitable for modelling processes of morphogenesis, is finalised, whereas 
the concept of crisis specifies a generic kind of converging or non-converging process assumed to 
degenerate the initial one. We may say that morphogenesis is a particular type of crisis.  
_____ 
5
Acta Europeana Systemica n°8 
Disaster relates to a judgement about the new resultant post-crisis or post-catastrophe configurations 
or effects. 
Another example is given by the concept of crisis in physics, having a large number of well-studied 
related cases such as phase transitions, criticality, and meta-stability (Solé, 2011). We should also 
consider cracks within stressed materials reaching critical points of crisis leading to larger cracks or 
breakage (Yang, 2016). 
Non autonomous crises: sequences of linear or uncorrelated deviations 
We consider here the case where subsequent changes, deviations within current process(es), have the 
same correlation as the parasitized process(es). In this case deviations are linear. A particular case 
occurs when deviations are constant or have a regular rate, e.g., constant payment rate, or regularly 
increasing up to an end, e.g., pains during childbirth.  
Another case occurs when subsequent changes, deviations within current process(es) constituting the 
crisis, are uncorrelated. In this case changes or deviations are uncorrelated events, i.e., they constitute 
only sequences and it is not possible to speak of processes.  
Examples include sequences of robberies occurring in a town, degenerative events occurring within 
abandoned sites, percentages of energy spent in mechanical processes due to friction assumed to be 
irregularly degenerative and the stable, increasing or irregular sequence of percentage of money spent 
due to bureaucracy or gambling addiction.  
Crisis as an autonomous process: sequences of correlated changes 
We consider here the case where a crisis consists of subsequent correlated changes which establish a 
process corresponding non-linearly to the parasitized hosting one(s). 
Here, deviations, or changes from the hosting dynamics acquire their own specific evolution, e.g., 
changes may increase in intensity, succeed one another with increasing speed, slow down or acquire 
non-linear sequences. However, the properties of such evolution need to be acquired case by case 
being context sensitive. 
An interesting case occurs when the autonomous evolution of crisis processes which are parasitic of 
the current ones, as considered in the previous case, exhibits similar characteristics or properties. The 
crisis process can be considered autonomous from the hosting one(s) when it is possible to study its 
sequences independently, i.e., as a generic type of process to be investigated per se, without contextual 
references. This opens up the possibility of studying types of crisis in the same way as Systems 
Science studies system properties independently from the systems possessing or acquiring such 
properties (Minati and Pessa, 2006; 2018). In this view, the same type of crisis may apply to different 
processes and cases, but can be suitably treated with the same approaches.  
We may consider types of crisis as being given by their characteristics, for instance, whether they are 
convergent in different ways e.g., linear, non-linear, or stochastically leading to a final, ideal or real, 
catastrophic event.  
Further types of crisis may relate to the same possessed or acquired systemic properties, such as the 
reduction of openness or reduction of coherence for processes of emergence. 
Considering various types of crisis also allows one to better recognise them. 
Crises as autonomous processes acquire their own identities and forms of independence 
from the original, hosting, parasitized one(s) 
Single or multiple crisis processes may occur, with or without correlations between them, both 
autonomous and non-autonomous, such as a respiratory crisis with changes in body temperature. 
Autonomous crisis processes may combine or interfere, both in linear and non-linear ways, with the 
hosting process or even superimpose it until, possibly and at different levels, replacing it leading to 
degenerative or transformative transitions.  
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Autonomous crisis processes may develop on their own, acquiring emergent properties. 
There are also processes of diffusion of crises, when crisis processes may be contagious, and infect, 
through their malfunctioning, other interrelated processes. Conversely, this would allow one to talk of 
the localisation of crises. 
The term systemic crisis refers to cascading effects due to interdependencies in a system, such as those 
of markets or finance, where the crisis or failure of single entities or clusters of entities can diffuse, 
one elementary example being positive feedback. The term systematic risk relates to ‘simultaneous’, 
unavoidable, recurrent  impact upon components of a system, e.g., firms, due to the same perturbing 
effects, for example, earthquakes, terrorism or war. 
The case of coherence 
We consider here the particular case of crisis as an autonomous process where deviations, changes in 
hosting dynamics, acquire coherence as a particular case of those considered in the above sub-section 
Crisis as an autonomous process: sequences of correlated changes. An initial  localised crisis 
regarding one aspect of the hosting process then leads to cascades of other aspects subsequently 
acquiring their own coherence, e.g., long-range correlation, falling within the basin of an attractor, or 
following power laws. Examples include the emerging coherence of organised crime or the increasing 
malfunctioning of a device. 
Conversely, we may consider the case of a crisis possessing the same coherence of its hosting process, 
but leading in different ways to the loss of such coherence. Coherence is maintained but in such a 
decreasing way as to lead to its disintegration. One example is given by a swarm where inter-agent 
distances, for some reasons, increase in such a way as to lead to the disaggregation of the swarm. 
Analogous examples exist in economics. 
Changes as non-crises, non-processes 
We should consider when change can be suitably represented, considered as a process, as a case of a 
crisis process. 
A generic understanding of the term process lies in its being a sequence of interrelated steps, 
procedural, with phases, such as development in biology. It is possible to speak of processes of 
adaptation, aging, assessment, learning, or recovery. 
At this point we may ask whether any transformation, or transition, should be considered as a crisis 
process. Or conversely, which changes do not occur through crises. When is change not a process? 
We can consider as emblematic of a non-process change, but rather as an instantaneous change, in 
physics the Curie point (Biswas et al. , 2014), the critical temperature at which certain materials lose 
their permanent magnetic properties, i.e., the intrinsic magnetic moments of the components of a 
material change their direction. More generally, when criticalities (situations at the boundary between 
ordered and disordered dynamical phases) or metastability (ability to maintain or switch between 
states due to small fluctuations), occur (Christense and Moloney, 2005).  
It is matter of changes occurring as unique events, the change in its entirety rather than activating 
processes of subsequent changes converging to the overall change, such as a catastrophe. Such 
changes include: 
- the case of so-called intrinsic or radical emergence (Licata, 2008; 2010; Licata and Minati, 
2016). Examples include phase transitions (from water to ice, from paramagnetic to 
magnetic phases);  
- spontaneous symmetry breaking considered in Quantum Field Theory (acquisition of 
superconductivity, superfluidity and protein-folding);  
- the constitution of morphological catastrophic patterns (due, for instance, to volcanic 
eruptions and earthquakes);  
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- the formation of temporary dissipative structures, dynamically stable far from equilibrium, 
due to the  dissipation of matter and energy, such as whirlpools and hurricanes. 
We can also consider chaotic systems such as the climate, very dependent upon initial conditions and 
rapidly changing attractors. 
When change is recognised as being suitably represented as a crisis process then one needs to consider 
types of crises allowing for actions such as acceleration, avoidance, combination, enhancement, 
induction, modification, replication, deceleration, support, suspension, etc. of the crisis process. 
In fact, the study of the crisis process is related to the theory of change (Pessa, 2008). 
Symptoms 
We consider here problems in the diagnostics and prediction of crisis processes, distinguishing 
between crisis processes involving single systems or collective interactive systems establishing 
communities. 
In the case of single systems, one can consider the appearance of deviations, irregularities in current 
processes of the system under study. Such irregularities may concern linear processes, parametrical 
changes for non-linear processes, correlations among processes, and loss of coherence for emergent 
processes. Irregularities may vary, for instance, by type, by the way they recur, by their intensity, or by 
their correlation. 
Correlated irregularities may finally converge to a resulting dominating general irregularity possibly 
having overall effects on the hosting process, such as a catastrophe. 
Otherwise correlated irregularities may eventually acquire coherence and result in an emergent process 
of crisis. The autonomy of such emergent crisis processes however does not remove their fundamental 
parasitic nature of necessarily deriving from the hosting process(s). 
In the second case, where collective interactive systems establish communities, their correlation 
properties provide a significant indicator. 
It has been found, for instance, that before obvious symptoms of crisis appear within the community, 
correlations within that community increase and, at the same time, so does its variance (Gorbana, 
2010). We recall that in statistics, variance is the expectation of the squared deviation of a random 
variable from its mean. It measures how far a set of random numbers is spread out from its mean. 
Furthermore, once crisis processes reach their degeneration and converge towards their catastrophic 
end, a process may diverge into two different directions where either correlations and variance 
decrease, with concomitant recovery, or where correlations decrease but variance continues to 
increase, leading to a final catastrophic end (Gorbana, 2010). 
Levels of representation 
This sub-section concludes with a few comments regarding levels of representation. The temporal and 
spatial level should be selected by considering the appropriateness for the occurrence of significant 
processes of change and their concomitant results. 
The level of representation relates to the adoption of micro-, macro- or mesoscopic levels (Buzsáki 
and Christen, 2016; Fannes et al., 1994; Liljenstrom and Svedin, 2005).  
In short, at the microscopic level, constituent entities are considered as not being further reducible, 
such as individual vehicles in road traffic not being reducible to components such as wheels or 
engines. This level is of interest when considering, for instance, crises in traffic flow such as  
gridlocks. 
At the macroscopic level, we consider the same, aggregated, microscopic entities and their properties, 
such as a gas consisting of microscopic entities (molecules) and macroscopic properties such as 
temperature, volume and pressure. At this level all microscopic information is lost. This level is of 
interest when considering, for instance, crisis of markets, e.g., recessions. 
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At the mesoscopic level, we consider clusters of microscopic properties such as how many people 
within a building are using the stairs in any given instant regardless of whether they are ascending or 
descending or simply standing still on the stairs. At this level, not all microscopic information is lost, 
but rather clustered. This level is of interest when considering, for instance, crisis of niche markets, 
e.g., their dynamics of appearing and disappearing with effects on other markets. 
A crisis may be invisible at one level of representation but visible at another. 
As an example, consider the invisibility of a hypothetical flock established by artificial boid-like 
agents having very long spatial distances between them. Such a flock is not detectable from earth by 
the naked eye. Another hypothetical case occurs when the time interval among interacting agents, 
where one influences another’s behaviour, for instance, through the exchange of information or 
energy, is very long when considered on the time scale of the observer as in geology. 
Furthermore, processes of emergence are detectable by observers provided with a suitable cognitive 
system, considered in cognitive science (Friedenberg and Silverman, 2015; Nescolarde-Selva, 2014) as 
a system of interactions related to the affective and emotional sphere, attention, the inferential system, 
language, logical activity, memory, and perception. The experimental detection of phenomena of 
emergence, such as that of a flock, with its dynamical coherences, requires, for instance, suitable 
memory and inferential activity, in order to recognise a flock even when it is changing patterns, 
density, altitude, or direction. Although it may not be possible to cognitively, experimentally, detect a 
collective behaviour for scaling problems, it is possible to observe properties, such as mathematical 
ones, to be considered as characteristics, or symptoms, of collective behaviours such as the occurrence 
of attractors, bifurcations, chaos, coherence, network, power laws, scale invariance, and symmetry 
breaking properties. 
Finally, we may ask whether the hosting process and the crisis process should necessarily have the 
same level of representation. 
ACTIONS ON CRISES 
After the considerations introduced above we can take into account types of intervention having 
different contextual suitability for the complexity level of the process of crisis under study. However, 
correspondences between types of crisis and types of action can only be indicative and not prescriptive 
or procedural since effectiveness depends mainly on context conditions and the modifying effects 
expected. The experimenter is required to contextualise depending on the nature of the process of 
crisis under study. As for complex problems, crisis processes (not always easily distinguishable 
from the hosting process) should be managed, i.e., channelled, hindered, and where possible 
induced, influenced, oriented, perturbed, decelerated or accelerated, or varied, rather than 
solved, i.e., converted, removed, stopped, or suspended. 
Actions on causes 
Causes are intended as being identified in constructivist ways, depending on the variables and models 
considered which are available to the observer. Constructivism, Cognitivism, and Cognitive Science 
(Friedenberg and Silverman, 2015), consider the observer as a generator of effective, i.e., with the 
power to act concretely, cognitive reality rather than of relativism. Overall, the cognitive strategy is to 
pass from trying to understand how something really is to finding out how it is more effective to think 
of it. For instance, a process may be considered as degenerative or transformational, an illness as 
biological or psychological, a system as complex or not, and a mathematical problem as being 
algebraic or geometrical. However, if on the one hand, the constructivist approach helps to conceive 
possible alternative options to understand cognitive reality, on the other, it also supports a multiple 
understanding by substituting the option or with and, even though to different contextualised degrees 
(see the case of the DYnamic uSAge of Models (DYSAM) in Minati and Pessa, 2006, pp. 64-75). 
Causes are considered to originate crises and assumed to be identifiable. However, any internal 
fluctuations or external perturbations sufficiently intense and compatible with the on-going processes 
may give rise to a process of crisis. This can happen, for example, when fluctuations or external 
perturbations are, unfortunately, not suitably elaborated by a current process in such a way as to start 
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parasitic crisis processes, for example, by superimposing increasing variations on running processes 
adopting over time significant interfering effects. The concept also includes any kinds of aggregated 
causes. Here we simply refer to them as causes. 
Causes adopted giving rise to crises may be of different types.  
For instance causes may come in any combinations: 
- Accidental, unintentional and having no other effective explanations for their occurrence, 
except chance. This cause may have a brief or undefined temporal duration.  
- Persistent, the cause persists over a long time-span, in proportion to the duration of the hosting 
process. Its persistence is required to maintain the crisis process.  Another situation occurs 
when non-persistent causes produce configuration changes having long term effects.  
- Temporary, the cause persists for a short time-span, proportional to the duration of the hosting 
process. Its persistence is not required to maintain the initiated process of crisis. Another 
situation occurs when the cause produces configuration changes having temporary effects. 
- Emergent, self-acquired, unexpectedly the interaction and the interfering of on-going 
processes, possibly perturbed, make emergent a new process, in this case a process of crisis. A 
case may occur when on-going processes generate perturbing side effects. Side effects can 
establish an additional cause or be additional inputs to be elaborated by the on-going 
processes. 
The concept of cause may be considered in different ways within linear contexts (LCs) or non-linear 
contexts (NLCs). 
In LCs a cause may be considered as any parametrical variation within the process and as having 
linear outcomes. 
In NLCs and their combinations with LCs a cause may be considered as any parametrical variation 
within the process and as having non-linear outcomes. 
Malfunctioning in emergent processes may be caused by the occurrence of defects or lack of stability 
of the initial conditions, e.g., resources available, environmental situations, or external perturbations. 
The acquisition of the nature of emergence by a process of on-going sequences of steps toward a crisis 
may be caused by the acquisition of synchronisation(s) and coherence in correlation with those of 
external perturbations, environmental situations, or the cyclic nature of side-effects. 
Actions on causes, such as their removal or changing, may have expected outcomes except when the 
crisis process activated becomes autonomous and independent from the initial cause.  
When the process of crisis is due to the continuous presence of a cause, then some regulatory 
hypotheses are plausible. 
In the following, we briefly mention some possible reorienting (as opposed to regulatory) approaches 
when the crisis processes are assumed to have possibly acquired properties such as having adaptive, 
reconfiguring, restoring, and self-repairing abilities due, for instance, to robustness of coherence 
having several different means of self-sustenance. 
Actions on dominance 
The experimenter should have tools available to detect and reveal the dominant components of the 
process of crisis. In conceptual accordance with the search for order parameters in Synergetics 
(Haken 1988), we consider here the possibility of finding the possible dominant ones in specific crises. 
More generally, it may be of help, for instance, to consider possible statistical properties (Georgy  et 
al., 1016) detected using suitable techniques such as Principal Components Analysis (PCA) (Jolliffe, 
2002; Vidal and Sastry, 2016), Recurrence Quantification Analysis (RQA), Multivariate Data Analysis 
(MDA), Cluster Analysis mentioned above,  , Time-Series Analysis (Box et al., 2015), Pearson 
Product Moment Correlation Coefficient (PPMCC) (Rupp and Walk, 2007) . 
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However, besides the hypothesis of detecting the dominant process imposing, for instance, linearity or 
non-linearity, complexity properties such as power laws, network properties, scale invariance, meta-
structural properties, or evolution in general, one may consider how and why the dominating process is 
established. 
Since such multiple processes are assumed to interact and interfere amongst themselves, the dominant 
one may even be considered as being given by the processes of interaction and interference 
themselves. While actions on the dominant one, intended as the consequent, resulting, in some way 
acquired one, are expected to have consequent cascade effects, in turn, actions on interactions and 
interference are expected to have effects on its dominance, possibly affecting the occurrence and 
identification of the dominant process itself. 
Actions on steps 
Local actions on steps of the crisis process usually have local reparative purposes. 
Supposed regulatory, modifying, and restoring actions on steps are usually the preferred options, being 
the more intuitive and urgent to deal with current negative effects. 
Local modifying interventions may be intended as adjusting local values as if they came from 
occasional and unfortunate deviations from the on-going regular processes in the hope of restarting the 
usual process, activating a return to normality. 
However, this may positively perturb a process of emergent crisis or of malfunctioning emergence, 
even without guaranteeing suitable consequent, and desired regulatory effects. The strategy to reassess 
the process by acting on local steps may be based on various assumptions about the process, such as 
its linearity, its possible adaptive or self-restorative capabilities, and its effects on other interacting and 
interfering processes. In this last case, the desired effect could be to make other processes dominant. 
Actions through antagonistic interventions 
The strategy in this case is to contrast the process of crisis. This intervention may have the purpose of 
weakening, or extinguishing the crisis process with the hypothesis that the crisis is the problem, with 
the purpose of clearing the field to allow (re-)emergence of other more welcome processes. The source 
of the unwanted crisis process may remain unidentified and neglected once made inoffensive.  
Otherwise the strategy is to change the game in some way, even though the new game cannot be 
completely decided. 
Strengthening actions on the hosting process 
In this case there is the working assumption that the clearly distinguishable crisis process can 
parasitize the hosting one because of the latter's weakness. In the case of non-linear relationships 
between the two processes, the strengthening action may make the original process more robust and 
able to resume its evolutionary path. If the process of crisis can be considered as a deviation, as a 
degeneration of the original one, this approach is counterproductive since such strengthening will 
affect both processes. 
Actions through invasive corrective interventions 
The strategy in this case is to invasively change the crisis process. The assumption is that the process 
can be distinguished from the original hosting processes. 
This simpler, invasive intervention consists of artificial changes to steps of the crisis processes as 
introduced above. 
Possible interventions may be assumed to have perturbing finalised purposes such as the start of other 
contextual contemporary, interfering processes having the desired nature, trying to make them 
dominant.  
As mentioned above, other kinds of intervention may be environmental by changing, for instance, the 
energy available, or by inserting suitable local, noise, perturbations, and impurities from the usual 
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environment. Other possible interventions may consist of invasive recovering interventions finalised 
for imposing new complete subsequent initial conditions rather than acting on single steps. 
Actions through incompatibilities 
This approach is conceptually based on possible well-known incompatibilities such as acting upon 
deflation, inflation, increase in interest rates, and increase in employment in economic systems. 
We consider here incompatibilities as possible constraints for the appearance or reduction in the 
degrees of freedom of crisis processes. 
It is possible to insert incompatibilities, for instance, by suitably changing sequences of steps of the 
crisis processes as if the crisis process were different, e.g., liquidity injections in economic crises, from 
the desired one (in this case actions on steps are not reparative but finalised to give a different 
orientation to the crisis process itself); by acting on the original processes to make them incompatible 
from a certain point onwards with the established parasitic, possibly emergent, process of crisis, e.g., 
by inserting faster or slower modifications or temporary convergences.  
This also has the purpose of reducing possible correlations among processes of crisis making them less 
robust. 
A strategy may be finalised to change the nature of the processes of crisis, for instance, by inserting 
aspects of linearity in NLCs and deactivating properties or emergence of processes of crisis such as 
coherence, correlation, validity of scale invariance and power laws. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We have tried to introduce a more precise understanding of what  a process of crisis is and how it can 
benefit from more suitable possible modifying interventions. Taking into account a suitable level of 
representation, considering various possibilities, such as the crisis as a parasitic non-autonomous 
process, as an autonomous process, as a convergent process, as being given by coherent, subsequent 
and related new degenerative properties or loss of coherence among emergent processes of the hosting 
one(s). We have outlined possible symptoms for the diagnosis and prediction of processes of crisis, 
presenting various examples and types of crises.  
In the section ACTIONS ON CRISES we proposed some generic types of actions on crises, possibly 
combined, such as actions on causes, on dominant processes, on steps in the crisis, strengthening 
actions on the hosting process, adopting antagonistic interventions against the crisis, adopting invasive 
corrective interventions, as well as the usage of incompatibilities. 
The main purpose of this article was to outline how there are different types of processes of crisis 
having different natures and how suitable approaches should be adopted, by avoiding standardised 
generic interventions assumed to have general effectiveness.  
Systems and processes of crisis may be of different types even though their complexity may be shared. 
Further research should consider suitable modelling allowing simulations. 
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